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The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Analysis of Economic Studies 
Abstract 
Congress plays a major role in formulating and implementing U.S. trade policy through its legislative and 
oversight responsibilities. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority to regulate foreign 
commerce, while the President has the authority to conduct foreign relations. In 2015, Congress 
reauthorized Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that( 1) sets trade policy objectives for the President to 
negotiate in trade agreements; (2) requires the President to engage with and keep Congress informed of 
negotiations; and (3) provides for Congressional consideration of legislation to implement trade 
agreements on an expedited basis, based on certain criteria. The United States is considering the 
recently-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries. The 
12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement must be ratified by each 
country before it can enter into force. In the United States this requires implementing legislation by 
Congress. 
The agreement is viewed by the participants as a “comprehensive and high standard” mega- regional free 
trade agreement that may hold the promise of greater economic opportunities and closer economic and 
strategic ties among the negotiating parties. 
For Members of Congress and others, international trade and trade agreements may offer the prospect of 
improved national economic welfare. Such agreements, however, have mixed effects on U.S. domestic 
and foreign interests, both economic and political. In considering the TPP, Congress likely will examine 
various economic studies to assess the impact of the agreement on the economy. The results of these 
studies vary depending on the model and the assumptions that are used to generate the results. The U.S. 
International Trade Commission is tasked with providing the official U.S. government estimate of the 
economic effects of the agreement. This report provides an analysis of various studies and information 
on the types of economic models that are used to assess the impact of trade agreements and the 
importance of the assumptions that are used in generating these estimates. 
Estimating the employment effects from a trade agreement is imprecise because (1) estimates can vary 
widely as a result of the model and assumptions that are used; (2) limitations arise from the types of data 
available, particularly concerning non-tariff barriers; and (3) it is difficult to disentangle the effects of trade 
and trade agreements from other factors that affect the U.S. economy, among other things. 
This report analyses some studies of the economic impact of TPP that are playing an important role in 
affecting the public policy debate, including the following: 
• U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC): estimated the TPP would increase annual 
U.S. GDP by 0.15%, and trade by 1.0% by 2032; U.S. annual employment would be higher 
by 128,000. 
• Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer (Peterson Institute for International Economics) 
estimated that the TPP would increase annual GDP by 0.5% and increase U.S. exports by 
9.0% by 2030. 
• World Bank: estimated the TPP would increase U.S. GDP by 0.5% by 2030. 
• Tufts University, Global Development and Environment Institute study by Jeronim Capaldo 
and Alex Izurieta: estimated that all TPP participants would lose 770,000 jobs and non-
TPP developing economies would lose 4.5 million jobs. 
• Other studies that use such proxy indicators as trade balances and jobs associated with 
exports to assess the impact of the TPP. 
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Summary 
Congress plays a major role in formulating and implementing U.S. trade policy through its 
legislative and oversight responsibilities. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority 
to regulate foreign commerce, while the President has the authority to conduct foreign relations. 
In 2015, Congress reauthorized Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that( 1) sets trade policy 
objectives for the President to negotiate in trade agreements; (2) requires the President to engage 
with and keep Congress informed of negotiations; and (3) provides for Congressional 
consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements on an expedited basis, based on 
certain criteria. The United States is considering the recently-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries. The 12 TPP countries signed the 
agreement in February 2016, but the agreement must be ratified by each country before it can 
enter into force. In the United States this requires implementing legislation by Congress.  
The agreement is viewed by the participants as a “comprehensive and high standard” mega-
regional free trade agreement that may hold the promise of greater economic opportunities and 
closer economic and strategic ties among the negotiating parties.  
For Members of Congress and others, international trade and trade agreements may offer the 
prospect of improved national economic welfare. Such agreements, however, have mixed effects 
on U.S. domestic and foreign interests, both economic and political. In considering the TPP, 
Congress likely will examine various economic studies to assess the impact of the agreement on 
the economy. The results of these studies vary depending on the model and the assumptions that 
are used to generate the results. The U.S. International Trade Commission is tasked with 
providing the official U.S. government estimate of the economic effects of the agreement. This 
report provides an analysis of various studies and information on the types of economic models 
that are used to assess the impact of trade agreements and the importance of the assumptions that 
are used in generating these estimates.  
Estimating the employment effects from a trade agreement is imprecise because (1) estimates can 
vary widely as a result of the model and assumptions that are used; (2) limitations arise from the 
types of data available, particularly concerning non-tariff barriers; and (3) it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of trade and trade agreements from other factors that affect the U.S. 
economy, among other things. 
This report analyses some studies of the economic impact of TPP that are playing an important 
role in affecting the public policy debate, including the following: 
 U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC): estimated the TPP would 
increase annual U.S. GDP by 0.15%, and trade by 1.0% by 2032; U.S. annual 
employment would be higher by 128,000. 
 Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics) estimated that the TPP would increase annual GDP by 0.5% and 
increase U.S. exports by 9.0% by 2030. 
 World Bank: estimated the TPP would increase U.S. GDP by 0.5% by 2030. 
 Tufts University, Global Development and Environment Institute study by 
Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta: estimated that all TPP participants would 
lose 770,000 jobs and non-TPP developing economies would lose 4.5 million 
jobs. 
 Other studies that use such proxy indicators as trade balances and jobs associated 
with exports to assess the impact of the TPP. 
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Introduction 
In February 2016, the United States signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 countries: 
Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
Brunei.1 The TPP, now subject to approval and implementation by Congress, is termed by its 
participants as a comprehensive and high-standard agreement, designed to eliminate and reduce 
trade barriers and establish and enhance trade rules and disciplines among the parties. If 
implemented, it would be the largest plurilateral FTA by value of trade, encompassing roughly 
40% of world GDP, and could serve further to integrate the United States in the dynamic Asia-
Pacific region. As a “living agreement,” it has the potential to negotiate new rules and expand its 
membership. It could also mark a shift to the negotiation of “mega-regional” trade liberalization 
agreements in lieu of bilateral FTAs and broader multilateral trade liberalization in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).2 
In considering TPP and other trade agreements, discussions often focus on potential economic 
effects, and especially on potential gains or losses in employment.3 In addition, some observers 
have tied U.S. trade deficits to existing U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) by arguing that the 
agreements have worsened the trade deficit and, thereby, have negatively affected U.S. 
employment and wages. According to many economists, trade in general provides economy-wide 
net positive benefits for consumers as a whole and for producers, especially for firms in export-
oriented industries. They also note, conversely, that economic adjustment costs stemming from 
lower trade barriers may be highly concentrated, affecting some workers, firms, and communities 
disproportionately. The relationship between trade and jobs, however, is complicated and subject 
to a number of different and, at times, opposing forces. In addition, impediments in local labor 
markets may raise adjustments costs for some workers, firms, and communities in ways that may 
not be fully reflected in traditional trade models.  
This report examines recent studies on the potential economic impact of the TPP. It also provides 
a limited discussion of the role of trade agreements in the economy and examines selected studies 
on the impact of TPP. For a broader treatment of some of these issues see CRS Report R44546, 
The Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy Challenges, by James K. Jackson. 
In general, economists and others use various economic models and approaches to estimate the 
magnitude of changes in U.S. economic activity and employment that could arise from a trade 
agreement. Both proponents and opponents of trade agreements often cite the results of these 
studies to support their respective positions. These models, however, differ in the estimates they 
produce, reflecting different assumptions and differences in the structure of the models 
themselves. While all the various models and approaches have strengths and weaknesses, 
                                                 
1 The United States currently has 14 free trade agreements with 20 countries in force. 
2 For additional information see CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues 
for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams. 
3 For example, Public Citizen, has a Global Trade Watch office that has written reports on globalization and free trade 
agreements. The group argues that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has a “disastrous legacy” and 
has failed to live up to promises made by NAFTA proponents at the time it was being negotiated. Their report is: 
NAFTA at 20, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, January 2014. Other viewpoints include Gary Clyde Hufbauer and 
Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, Institute for International Economics, October 2005, 
Chapter 1; Pardee Center Task Force Report, The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, 
Boston University, November 2009. 
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although not always in equal proportions, they vary in the degree to which they reflect economic 
reality, and they are highly sensitive to the assumptions they use.4  
Estimating the Economic Effects of 
Trade Agreements 
The TPP, considered by participants to be a high-standard and comprehensive agreement, is 
designed to eliminate and reduce trade barriers and establish and enhance trade rules and 
disciplines of the trading system among the parties to the agreement. The agreement covers 
goods, services, investment, and a number of other issues including trade facilitation, digital 
trade, intellectual property rights, and standards, or technical barriers to trade. Due to the 
limitations of data and other theoretical and practical issues involved with services, investment, 
and non-tariff barriers, most estimates of the economic and employment effects of trade and trade 
agreements focus narrowly on the goods sector, where data on trade and tariff rates are available, 
to estimate how demand for these goods may change as a result of changes in tariffs. 
Accordingly, such estimates do not represent the total impact of the agreement on the economy.  
Costs and Benefits of Trade 
Most economists argue that liberalized trade creates both economic costs and benefits, as 
indicated in Table 1, but that the long-run net effect on the economy as a whole is positive. They 
contend that the economy as a whole operates more efficiently as a result of competition through 
international trade and that consumers throughout the economy benefit by having available to 
them a wider variety of goods and services at varying levels of quality and price than would be 
possible in an economy closed to international trade. They also contend that trade may have a 
long-term positive dynamic effect on an economy that enhances both production and 
employment. In addition, trade agreements of the type currently being negotiated by the United 
States comprise a broad range of issues that could have far-ranging economic effects on trade and 
commercial relations over the long run between the negotiating parties, particularly for 
developing and emerging economies.  
Table 1. Economic Costs and Benefits of International Trade 
Economy-wide benefits Concentrated adjustment costs 
Efficiency gains as a result of greater competition. Potential job losses in some sectors. 
Consumption gains for consumers throughout the 
economy by having access to a wider variety of goods 
and services at varying levels of quality and price. 
Potential lower wages for some workers. 
 
Gains in real income for consumers and producers by 
having access to lower priced goods and services. 
 
Concentrated adjustments costs. Some workers and 
firms may experience a disproportionate share of the 
adjustment costs. Recent research is shedding new light 
on the extent to which these adjustment costs are 
concentrated in some communities. 
                                                 
4 Hertel, Thomas, David Hummels, Maros Ivanic, and Roman Keeney, How Confident Can We Be in CGE-Based 
Assessments of Free Trade Agreements?, GTAP Working Paper No. 26, March 2004; Brockmeier, Martina, A 
Graphical Exposition of the GTAP Model, GTAP Technical Paper No. 8, March 2001. 
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Economy-wide benefits Concentrated adjustment costs 
Long-term positive dynamic effects arising through 
increased productivity and technological development. 
 
The benefits and costs to the economy do not accrue at 
the same speed: the costs to the economy in the form of 
job losses are experienced in the initial stages, while the 
benefits to the economy accrue over time. 
Potential economic gains achieved through trade 
agreements that affect trade and commercial relations 
over the long run. 
 
Source: CRS. 
Most economists acknowledge that international trade and trade agreements can entail some 
negative effects through greater access to markets and increased competition, with the effects 
falling more heavily on some workers and firms. Generally, the costs and benefits associated with 
trade agreements do not accrue to the economy at the same speed; costs to the economy are felt in 
the initial stages of the agreement, while benefits to the economy accrue over time. The expected 
costs to the economy in the form of job losses and downward pressure on wages in some sectors 
and some segments of the labor force are experienced in the initial stages of the agreement, while 
the anticipated benefits to the economy in terms of enhanced consumer welfare and 
improvements in resource utilization accrue over time.  
In addition, while research is ongoing, most economists have concluded that trade liberalization, 
or international trade more broadly, has not been a major factor affecting the distribution of 
income, whether in the United States, or in other economies, developed or developing.5 Some 
economists also estimate that international trade and trade liberalization have a different impact 
on workers in various occupations in the economy, termed by some as the occupational exposure 
to international trade. 6 This means that trade liberalization can have a disproportionate impact on 
workers and firms not only in different sectors of the economy, but even within the same industry. 
Such types of microeconomic analysis at the firm level generally are not within the scope of trade 
models. 
                                                 
5 Stone, Susan, F., and Ricardo H. Cavazos Cepeda, “Wage Implications of Trade Liberalization: Evidence for 
Effective Policy Formation,” in Policy Priorities for International Trade and Jobs, ed., D. Lippoldt, OECD, 2012, p. 
75; Newfarmer, Richard, and Monika Sztajerowska, “Trade and Employment in a Fast-Changing World,” in Policy 
Priorities for International Trade and Jobs, p. 8-9.; McMillan, Margaret, and Dani Rodrik, Globalization, Structural 
Change, and Productivity Growth, February 2011, p. 23; McMillan, Margaret, and Inigo Verduzco, “New Evidence on 
Trade and Employment: An Overview,” in Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, Marion Jansen, Ralf Peters, 
and Jose Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs, eds., International Labor Organization, 2011, p. 2; Gibson, Bill, “Assessing the 
Impact of Trade on Employment: Methods of Analysis,” in Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, p. 61-62; 
Helpman, Elhanan, Oleg Itskhoki, and Stephen Redding, Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy, February 
2010; Harrison, Anne, John McLaren, and Margaret McMillan, Recent Perspectives on Trade and Inequality, Policy 
Research Working Paper 5754, The World Bank, August 2011, p.3; Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer, “Does 
Trade Cause Growth?,” The American Economic Review, June 1999, p. 379; Seizing the Benefits of Trade for 
Employment and Growth: Final Report, OECD, ILO, World Bank, and WTO, November 2010; World Trade Report 
2008, Differential Consequences of Trade, World Trade Organization, 2008, p. 123-146; Piketty, Thomas, and Gabriel 
Zucman, Wealth and Inheritance in the Long Run, April 6, 2014; Piketty, Thomas, and Gabriel Zucman, “Capital is 
Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 3, 2014. 
6 Artuc, Erhan, and John McLaren, Trade Policy and Wage Inequality: A Structural Analysis With Occupational and 
Sectoral Mobility, Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, September, 2012, p. 35.  
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Data Limitations 
The lack of data in areas other than direct trade in goods and services means that data on traded 
goods and some services can drive policy debates. Economists and others face numerous 
challenges in their efforts to estimate precisely the economic and employment effects that are 
associated with agreements that reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment flows, 
including non-tariff barriers to trade in services and other sectors. Trade in services, in particular, 
is characterized by a broad array of formal and informal barriers that complicate efforts to 
translate the barriers into tariff-equivalent values. Also, little analysis has been done to date on the 
potential economic effects of removing or reducing technical barriers to trade.7 Reduced barriers 
to trade in services potentially could have a large and positive impact on the U.S. economy, since 
informal barriers to trade in services are numerous, the United States is highly competitive in a 
number of services sectors, and U.S. direct investment abroad often spurs exports.  
The economic environment within which trade occurs is also being constantly shaped by 
domestic and international activities in ways that may be difficult to model and may not be fully 
reflected in the time series data that are the fundamental building blocks of trade models. For 
instance, the sharp decline in energy and raw material prices in 2015-2016 and the slowdown in 
global trade since 2011 are altering the global economy in ways that arguably exceed any 
potential trade agreement. It is unlikely that the complete effects of these changes have been fully 
reflected in global economic and trade data. Trade models also do not explicitly incorporate 
exchange rates, in part due to the difficulty involved in estimating future movements in exchange 
rates. Such models, therefore, rely on existing trade patterns that may limit their ability to 
estimate the impact of new trade patterns that could arise from a multi-country agreement.  
Trade models also generally treat exports and imports as strictly domestic or foreign goods. 
However, the rapid growth of global value chains (GVCs) and intra-industry trade (importing and 
exporting goods in the same industry) have significantly increased the amount of trade in 
intermediate goods in ways that challenge traditional concepts of domestic versus foreign firms 
and blur the distinction between exports and imports. For instance, foreign value added accounts 
for about 28% of the content on average of global exports.8 As a result of the growth in GVCs, 
traditional methods of counting trade may obscure the actual sources of goods and services and 
the allocation of resources that are used in producing those goods and services. Trade in 
intermediate goods also means that imports may be essential for exports and that countries that 
impose trade measures restricting imports may negatively affect their own exports.9 This complex 
process of cross-border production and trade in intermediate goods also utilizes a broad range of 
services in ways that have expanded and redefined the role that services play in international 
trade. Increased trade in intermediate goods has also meant that the number of jobs in the 
economy tied directly and indirectly to international trade has increased in ways that are not 
captured fully by trade models.  
                                                 
7 One such attempt concluded that, “Agreements on standards raise issues that are both politically and analytically 
challenging. Unlike tariffs, standards cannot be simply negotiated away because the original reason for their existence 
is not trade protection, but arguably the enhancement of welfare by remedying market failure-arising, for example, 
from invisible risks of product use, negative environmental externalities, or product incompatibility due to the 
producers’ failure to coordinate. Agreements on standards, therefore, aim to secure the gains from integrated markets 
without unduly compromising the role of standards as remedies for market failure. Chen, Maggie Xiaoyang, and 
Aaditya Mattoo, Regionalism in Standards: Good or Bad for Trade?, Canadian Journal of Economics 41 (3), p. 838-
863. 
8 World Investment Report 2013, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013, p. 123-127. 
9 Ibid., p. 172. 
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Current Trade Arrangements 
Efforts to estimate the economic impact of the proposed TPP are further complicated by the 
existence of overlapping trade agreements among the TPP countries: the United States already 
has FTAs with six TPP partners: Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore.10 In 
addition, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei are members of the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) FTA. Such agreements have both trade creating and trade diverting 
dimensions that can interact in tandem or in opposite ways that may complicate the trade 
environment. While it may not be possible for any trade model to incorporate all the economic 
effects that potentially could arise from overlapping trade agreements, such agreements may be 
reshaping trade patterns that ostensibly could be enhanced further by the TPP.  
In addition to the direct economic effects expected to result from cuts in tariffs, the TPP may offer 
additional long-term indirect benefits to bilateral and regional trade through changes in domestic 
non-tariff trade barriers that form the structure under which trade is conducted. In broad terms, 
the TPP incorporates rules and disciplines for open, transparent, non-discriminatory treatment for 
participants. These rules are expected to reduce market-distorting activities that not only reduce 
the overall level of trade, but create market inefficiencies. Some TPP participants have indicated 
that they intend to use the rules and disciplines in the TPP to support a reform agenda within their 
own economies. To the extent that countries undertake such reforms, the TPP potentially could 
provide long-term economic benefits to the countries themselves and to other TPP participants. 
Anticipated Changes in Trade Patterns 
Preferential multi-country trade agreements, such as the TPP, generally are expected to alter trade 
relations among the participants, stimulate economic growth, and improve overall economic 
welfare. By eliminating and reducing tariffs, trade agreements alter the external market conditions 
under which nations trade, while removing internal trade barriers alters the domestic structure 
under which trade is organized and conducted. Removing formal barriers to trade, primarily in the 
form of tariffs and quotas, directly lowers the prices of traded goods and thereby increases 
competition. In turn, lower prices are expected to alter trade patterns by increasing the amount of 
trade that occurs (trade creation) and by shifting trade away from countries that are not party to 
the agreement to those that are in the agreement (trade diversion). As a result, trade agreements 
may alter the composition of trade among a nation’s various trading partners and alter the mix of 
goods and services that are traded. At times, countries are motivated to participate in trade 
agreements to forestall this type of trade diversion.  
The magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion effects that may arise from the TPP are 
expected to depend on a number of factors, including the difference between pre-and post-
agreement tariff rates, the speed with which tariff cuts are implemented, and other external 
economic factors that may affect global trade as a whole. In addition, the impact of tariff cuts 
under the TPP may be muted to some extent by the multiplicity of trade agreements that already 
exist among the participants and the already-low average tariff rates that are characteristic of 
trade among a number of the participants, although countries may have currently high tariffs on 
specific products. 
For some countries, trade agreements may serve as a driving force for economic change in ways 
that cannot be quantified. Comprehensive free trade agreements as they currently are negotiated 
                                                 
10 Deardorff, Alan V., Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries, July 
24, 2013. 
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by the United States and others include a range of policy issues that have potentially significant 
cross-border implications, including trade in goods and services, investment, regulatory and other 
non-tariff barriers, government procurement, e-commerce, agricultural barriers, intellectual 
property rights, state-owned enterprises, worker rights, and the environment. As such, these trade 
agreements potentially can serve as catalysts for economic growth and development in ways that 
can affect a nation’s economy beyond what would be predicted from traditional trade models. 
This can be particularly important for developing countries that are trying to raise their own 
standards and see trade agreements as important tools for integrating themselves into regional and 
global economies and for implementing domestic economic reforms. In addition, trade 
agreements may attempt to standardize such governance issues as dispute resolution procedures 
that work to enforce and ensure that trade commitments are implemented.11 
Potential Changes in Employment 
Estimating the impact of trade and trade agreements on employment and wages in the economy is 
particularly challenging, because trade is only one among a number of factors that affect the 
overall level of employment and wages in an economy in both the short run and long run. In 
addition, most trade models lack the detailed industry and employment data that are necessary to 
make forecasts beyond broad categories of employment to identify specific jobs that may be 
affected positively or negatively. It is also difficult in most circumstances to disentangle the 
myriad number and types of forces within the economy that can affect employment and wages at 
the micro, or firm, level. Additionally, a broad range of internal and external activities can affect 
national economies to a greater degree than most trade agreements in ways that cannot be 
factored in ahead of time. These activities can complicate efforts to derive cause and affect 
relationships.  
Most economists argue that macroeconomic forces within the economy are the dominant factors 
that shape trade and foreign investment relationships. Nevertheless, changes at the 
microeconomic level associated with new technologies can affect particular industries or sectors 
of the economy in ways that are unrelated to international trade. In addition, changes in currency 
exchange rates, technology, interest rates, and the business cycle, among other things, can affect 
the overall state of the economy in ways that can outweigh the effects of trade agreements, given 
the already highly open nature of the U.S. economy. For the United States, exports account for 
about 13% of U.S. GDP and support over 11 million jobs, or about 8% of a total of 141 million 
workers in the U.S. economy.12 Imports also support a broad spectrum of jobs, including 
wholesale and retail trade, transportation, and various other services, among others. As a result of 
the small share of trade-related jobs in the U.S. economy relative to other sectors, most 
economists argue that international trade is only one among a number of forces that determine 
total U.S. employment, real wages, or the distribution of income.13 
                                                 
11 Tussie, Diana, and Carlos Aggio, Economic and Social Impacts of Trade Liberalization, in Coping With Trade 
Reforms: A Developing Country Response on the WTO Industrial Tariff Negotiations, ed. by Fernandez de Cordoba, 
Santiago, and Sam Laird, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, July 8, 2008, p. 92.  
12 Johnson, Martin, and Chris Rasmussen, Jobs Supported by Exports 2013: An Update, Manufacturing and Services 
Economics Brief, International Trade Administration, February 24, 2014. 
13 For instance see Jorgenson, Dale W., Productivity and Economic Growth, in: Fifty Years of Economic Measurement: 
The Jubilee of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, ed. by Ernst R. Berndt and Jack E. Triplett, 
University of Chicago Press, 1991; Burstein, Ariel, and Jonathan Vogel, “Globalization, Technology, and the Skill 
Premium: A Quantitative Analysis,” NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 16459, October 2010, p. 23. 
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Labor Supply 
Over the long run, the national birth rate, improvements in productivity, and flows of 
immigration/emigration, among other things, affect the overall supply of labor in the economy. 
Although trade agreements arguably have no impact on the fundamental supply of labor in the 
economy, the level and extent of globalization of the economy has broadened the definition of the 
labor market. As a result, the labor market itself has become more globalized, especially with the 
opening of major markets to international trade and the growing use of new technologies. The 
shares of national income that go to labor as wages also depend on the overall demand for labor 
in the economy relative to the supply and the overall level of utilization of the other factors of 
production in the economy, all of which can change over the course of the business cycle and 
during periods of pronounced structural transformation.  
As an economy expands, greater demands are placed on labor and other factors of production. At 
some stages of the business cycle, labor may reap a larger share of the rewards of production, 
while at other stages, a greater share of the rewards may accrue to the owners of production. In 
addition, structural changes in the economy can reshuffle capital and labor in the economy in 
ways that may alter the share of income that goes to labor and capital. Such structural changes 
also can reflect changes in technology that place a greater emphasis on certain types of skills. In 
addition, as technology is spread internationally, emerging economies can similarly experience 
improvements in productivity that may place additional competitive pressures on U.S. workers in 
some industries and at some skill levels. While such structural changes can be unsettling to some 
workers and sectors of the economy, other conditions such as economic stagnation are potentially 
more unsettling since all workers and sectors in the economy would be affected negatively.14 
Firm and Job Turnover 
In a dynamic economy such as the United States, firms and jobs are constantly being created and 
replaced as some economic activities expand, while others contract, reflecting both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic developments. These processes would be expected to occur 
during the implementation period of a trade agreement, but they would occur even in the absence 
of international trade. This constant change, however, complicates efforts to isolate the impact of 
a trade agreement on the structure of the economy from other dynamic forces that are constantly 
reshaping the economy. Moreover, various industries and sectors evolve over time at different 
speeds, reflecting differences in technological advancement, productivity, and efficiency. 
International trade may add to these forces to provide added impetus to both growing and 
declining industries.  
Those sectors of the economy that are the most successful in developing or incorporating new 
technological advancements generate greater economic rewards and are capable of attracting 
greater amounts of capital and labor. In contrast, those sectors or individual firms that lag behind 
are less capable of attracting capital and labor and confront ever-increasing competitive 
challenges. Indeed, depending on the overall state of the economy, some sectors may need to 
relinquish some capital and labor in order for others sectors to grow to avoid economic 
stagnation. Also, advances in communications, technology, and transportation have facilitated a 
global transformation of economic production into sophisticated supply chains that span national 
borders and defy traditional concepts of trade that potentially can involve a greater share of the 
                                                 
14 Most standard economic textbooks have information on business cycles, see Samuelson, Paul A., and William D. 
Nordhaus, Economics, Irwin/McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
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labor force in trade-related activities.15 How firms respond to these challenges likely will 
determine their long-term viability in the market place. 
Job Churning 
Another factor that complicates attempts to equate a specific trade agreement, or even trade in 
general, with job gains or losses in the economy is the constant turnover in jobs, referred to as 
“churn,” taking place in the U.S. economy. At the plant level, job openings may come from new 
business openings or expansions at existing facilities, including those that are used to support 
increased exports. Job losses may come from voluntary departures, involuntary discharges, or 
business closures for any reason, including bankruptcy, personal choice, an inability to compete 
in the domestic market, import competition, or production shifts. In 2015, there was an average of 
141.1 million jobs in the U.S. economy, of which 11.7 million jobs, or about 8%, were supported 
directly and indirectly by exports. At the same time, there were 7.6 million gross jobs gained in 
the economy and 6.7 million gross jobs lost, accounting for 5.4% and 4.8%, respectively, of the 
total number of jobs in the economy.16 This combined share of 14.3% (the combined shares of 
gross jobs gained and lost) reflects annual churning in the labor market, or an amount that is 
greater than both the number of jobs in the economy that are supported by exports and the 
projected impact on labor that potentially could arise from the TPP.  
Adjustment Costs 
International trade may not have a determinative role in shaping the U.S. economy as a whole, 
but economic theory recognizes that trade can affect the economy through a number of channels, 
including through increased competition. Economic theory also recognizes that some workers, 
firms, and communities in the economy may experience a disproportionate share of the short-term 
adjustment costs associated with shifts in resources stemming from greater international 
competition. There may also be instances in which foreign firms engage in unfair competition or 
trade-distorting practices. Most trade models do not contain enough consumer information to 
estimate these potential costs and benefits or enough industry and employment data to determine 
which specific jobs or which specific firms might be affected negatively or positively by a 
particular trade agreement. Although the attendant adjustment costs for businesses and workers 
are difficult to measure, some estimates indicate that they potentially are significant over the 
short-run. For some communities, closed plants can result in depressed commercial and 
residential property values and lost tax revenues, with effects on schools, public infrastructure, 
and community viability.17 
Some estimates indicate that the short-run costs to workers who attempt to switch occupations or 
switch industries in search of new employment opportunities as a result of trade-related 
dislocations may be “substantial.”18 In a study of the impact of trade liberalization on 
occupations, a number of economists used detailed microeconomic data to conclude that trade 
                                                 
15 See CRS Report R40167, Globalized Supply Chains and U.S. Policy, by Dick K. Nanto. 
16 Business Employment Dynamics-Second Quarter 2015, Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 27, 2016, and 
Employment Situation-January 2016, Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 5, 2016; Jobs Supported by Exports 2014, 
An Update, International Trade Administration, March 4, 2015. 
17 Schneider, Howard, “When a Factory Leaves Town: In the Shadow of Silicon Valley, A City Reels From Job 
Losses,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2014. 
18 Artuc, Erhan, and John McLaren, Trade Policy and Wage Inequality: A Structural Analysis With Occupational and 
Sectoral Mobility, Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, September, 2012, p. 35.  
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liberalization has a small effect on wages and jobs at the industry level, but that it provided an 
additional impetus within the economy for workers to shift their employment among sectors of 
the economy, particularly from the manufacturing sector to the services sector.19 The study also 
concluded that workers who switched jobs as a result of trade liberalization generally experienced 
a reduction in their wages, particularly in occupations where workers performed routine tasks. 
These negative income effects were especially pronounced in occupations exposed to imports 
from lower-income countries. In contrast, occupations that were associated with exports, 
generally higher skilled jobs, experienced a positive relationship between rising incomes and the 
growth in export shares.  
Trade Models 
Trade models used to analyze FTAs are part of a class of economic models referred to as 
computable general equilibrium models (CGE) that incorporate data on trade and a range of 
domestic economic variables, including an industry input-output (I-O) table,20 employment, and 
labor data, on as many as 100 countries. The most commonly used CGE economic model and 
database is the Global Trade Atlas Project (GTAP), located at Purdue University,21 that is used to 
estimate changes in trade (exports and imports) from changes in tariff rates and tariff rate 
quotas.22 CGE trade models are widely used and have proven to be helpful in estimating the 
effects of trade liberalization in such sectors as agriculture and manufacturing where the barriers 
to trade are more easily identifiable and quantifiable. The United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC), economists Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer, and the World Bank 
all use the GTAP model for their simulations. In contrast, economists Jeronim Capaldo and Alex 
Izurieta use a different model to develop their estimates of the impact of TPP. Due to the unique 
nature of the model and the approach used by Capaldo and Izurieta, this model and its estimates 
are given a relatively lengthy treatment in this report. 
CGE models are long-run microeconomic models that have been used widely and tested 
thoroughly. The models provide estimates of the distribution of potential gains and losses 
expressed as proportional effects (percentage increases or decreases in trade) for various sectors, 
relative to certain baseline economic projections. Modelers argue that the microeconomic 
approach is justified because trade policies operate through microeconomic channels by tracing 
changes in trade policy to national productivity levels, wages, and incomes.23 Although the 
limitations of the models are well-known (see earlier sections), the models arguably represent a 
rigorous, data-centric approach to estimating the economic effects of trade agreements. Trade 
models also use data that represent well-established trade relationships between countries, which 
means they are limited in their ability to estimate the impact of a new trade agreement on goods 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Input-output tables follow the use of resources through the economy at the industry level by tracking the outputs of 
one industry as inputs to another.  
21 The databases are cooperatively produced and maintained by researchers and scholars. The model includes many 
sectors and 100 countries in the world. 
22 Tariff-rate quotas permit a specific quantity of imported merchandise to enter at a reduced rate of customs duty 
during the quota period. There is no limit on the amount of the quota product that may be imported into the U.S. at any 
time, but quantities entered during the quota period in excess of the quota quantity for that period are subject to higher 
duty rates. 
23 Petri, Peter A. and Michael G. Plummer, The Economics of Analyzing the TPP: Submission to the U.S. International 
Trade Commission, February 15, 2016, p. 2. 
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or services that previously had not been traded due to barriers or on trade between countries that 
previously had a limited trade relationship. 
Given the size and complexity of the CGE models, they must necessarily operate with a number 
of assumptions. One such assumption is that the economies in question are operating at full 
employment. While some experts question the assumption of full employment, it does not seem 
unreasonable considering the long-term time frame generally required for most trade agreements 
to be fully implemented. During this time, the economy would be expected to return to its long-
term growth path at or near full employment. Over the estimating period, a persistently low level 
of unemployment is unlikely to have a significant impact on the results of the models, given the 
multitude of other assumptions involved in generating the estimates. In addition, during the 
implementation period, it seems questionable to assume that the rate of unemployment would 
persist at levels that would be high enough to have a significant impact on the estimates. In most 
cases, either the economy would be expected to return to full employment solely through market 
forces, or the government would be expected to intervene by adopting Keynesian-style 
stimulative macroeconomic policies (changes in tax rates or government spending) to move the 
economy toward full employment.  
As a result of the large number of countries that often are included in trade models and the vast 
amounts of trade data used, the models necessarily must sacrifice some level of precision in their 
estimating abilities. The models are intended to provide insight into the mechanisms by which 
changes in tariffs or other parameters may affect changes in trade flows among a set of countries. 
As a consequence, trade models aggregate vast amounts of data into a manageable size, for 
instance by reducing more than 17,000 individual commodities into about 50 categories and over 
150 countries into 29 different country and geographic regions. As a result, tariffs in the models 
represent weighted averages of tariffs for the commodities that are aggregated into these basic 
groups. This procedure tends to mask the importance of those products within the aggregate that 
have high tariffs rates, which often are the target of new trade agreements.  
Trade models generally do not incorporate assumptions about the speed with which tariff changes 
affect the relevant economies, leaving it to the modelers to make assumptions about how quickly 
changes in tariff rates will be passed along in goods prices and about the timing of any 
adjustments. These models also make no assumptions about the basic input-output structure of the 
economy and do not attempt to adjust this structure to account for economic or technical changes 
that lead an industry to substitute one factor for another. This assumption is important, because 
standard economic theory indicates that changes in goods prices, whether from changes in tariff 
rates or from some other source, give rise to changes in the demand for labor and capital and, 
therefore, that price changes ultimately will alter the basic input-output structure of the economy. 
Since most large trade models originally were developed with the intent of analyzing the 
economic effects of such broad multi-country trade agreements as the Uruguay Round, this lack 
of precision was not considered to be an important drawback. However, this lack of precision 
may be an issue when the models are used to estimate the effects of bilateral and plurilateral free 
trade agreements where the overall amount of trade, and therefore the impact of the agreement, 
generally would be expected to be less than that of a WTO-style multilateral agreement. 
Trade models such as the CGE differ from large macroeconomic models that are used to forecast 
changes in the rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP), wages, taxes, or jobs. As a result, 
trade models do not yield precise estimates of the number of jobs that will be affected by any 
particular trade agreement. In response, some groups have used various methods and proxy 
estimators to assess the potential impact of trade agreements on jobs, which have produced a wide 
range of estimates. As examples of these approaches, some groups have used such indicators as 
trade deficits, or estimates of the number of jobs in the economy that are supported by exports, to 
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develop estimates of the impact of trade and trade agreements on jobs in the economy. These 
models may face important limitations of data and theoretical and practical issues that make it 
difficult to derive precise estimates of the impact of a particular trade agreement on the 
economy.24  
Overview of Economic Estimates of the TPP 
This section provides an overview of various studies, their assumptions and a description of the 
models used to estimate the economic impact of the proposed TPP on U.S. trade, employment, 
and GDP relative to a baseline projection. The studies were selected because they are widely cited 
and are affecting the public policy debate about TPP. 
United States International Trade Commission 
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) is tasked by Congress to provide 
economic assessments of U.S. trade agreements:25 it released a comprehensive assessment of the 
economic impact of the TPP agreement in May 2016. The ITC used the GTAP model (see above) 
to estimate changes in trade (exports and imports) from changes in tariff rates and tariff rate 
quotas. The ITC also adjusted the GTAP model to provide a more detailed estimate of the impact 
of the TPP on foreign investment and trade in services. In addition, the ITC: 
 Used a qualitative approach to estimate the economic impact commitments on 
government procurement, competition, state-owned enterprises, and intellectual 
property.26  
 Made some assumptions about the evolution of the U.S. and world economies 
without the TPP in five-year steps to 2047, including a straight-line projection of 
annual U.S. growth rate of 2%.  
 Attempted to make the traditional GTAP model more dynamic by incorporating 
projections of capital accumulation, labor availability, and growth rates for 
population and gross domestic product (GDP) developed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). The 
model simulations also include potential trade policy changes that would be 
expected to occur in the absence of TPP.  
 Modified the standard GTAP model to include the 12 TPP countries and to 
include various regions27 and 56 industry sectors.  
 Adjusted the model to account for dynamic labor supply effects by assuming that 
labor supply would expand or contract as real wages rise or fall and that skilled 
and unskilled labor would receive the largest share of the gains in GDP. The 
                                                 
24 For additional information see CRS Report R44546, The Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy 
Challenges, by James K. Jackson. 
25 Section 105(c)(2)–(3) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-26). 
26 The qualitative approach contrasts the commitments in TPP to current practices and/or obligations under existing 
agreements with TPP parties in order to highlight the extent of the changes introduced by TPP. Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, United States 
International Trade Commission, Publication No. 4607, May 2016, p. 48. 
27 The regions include China, European Union, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and the Rest of the 
World. 
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GTAP model does not capture the employment and age effects in the short run, 
but reflects such changes in its long-run forecasts 28 
 The simulations assume that nations are at full employment and will take full 
advantage of reduced tariffs and increases in tariff-rate quotas.  
The results of the GTAP model are expressed as proportional effects (percentage increases or 
decreases or changes in dollar amounts) for a number of variables, relative to a projection of the 
economy, which serves as the baseline condition for the modelling exercise. According to this 
analysis, by 2032, U.S. annual real income would be $57.3 billion (0.23 percent) higher than the 
baseline projections, real GDP would be $42.7 billion (0.15 percent) higher, annual employment 
would be 0.07 percent higher (128,000 full-time equivalents), and the capital stock would 
increase by 0.18% with TPP, as indicated in Table 2.  
Table 2. ITC Estimated Economy-Wide Effects of TPP 
(in billions of dollars; percentage change from baseline projections to 2032 and 2047) 
 2032 2047 
Real Income $57.3 0.23% $82.5 0.28% 
Real GDP $42.7 0.15% $67.0 0.18% 
Employment (full time equivalents, thousands) 128.2 0.07% 174.3 0.09% 
Capital stock $171.5 0.18% $343.5 0.24% 
Source: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, 
United States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 4607, May 2016, p. 70. 
The ITC also estimated the share of the dynamic U.S. economy-wide effects of TPP by 2032 
related to three groups of provisions: traded goods, services, and investment on five economic 
areas—real income, GDP, exports, imports, and employment—indicated in Figure 1. This 
analysis indicates that the largest share of the overall gains from TPP arise from provisions 
related to traded goods (reductions in tariffs, tariff quotas, and non-tariff measures).  
                                                 
28 The ITC reviewed academic literature on the responsiveness of the supply of labor to a change in wages, or the labor 
supply elasticity. According to this literature, the elasticity ranged from 0.2 to 0.8; the ITC used the middle estimate of 
0.4%, or a 1% change in wages affects a 0.4% change in labor supply. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, p. 89-90. 
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Figure 1. ITC Estimated Share of Gains in U.S. Real Income, GDP, Exports, Imports, 
and Employment From Major Provisions of TPP 
(shares in percentage) 
 
Source: International Trade Commission. 
In addition, annual U.S. exports and U.S. imports with TPP partners are projected to be $57.2 
billion (5.6%) and $47.5 billion (3.5%) higher, respectively, relative to baseline projections, as 
indicated in Table 3. Of this amount, annual exports and imports with new FTA partners under 
TPP are projected to increase by $34.6 billion (18.7%) and $23.4 billion (10.4%), respectively by 
2032. This data indicate that the majority of growth in U.S. exports is with new TPP partners. 
Overall, annual U.S. exports to the world are projected to increase by $27.2 billion and imports 
are projected to increase by $48.9 billion by 2032 under TPP, reflecting projected increases in 
U.S. real incomes, changes in real international prices, and some diverting of trade away from 
non-TPP countries toward TPP countries. 
Table 3. ITC Estimated Effects of TPP on U.S. Trade 
(in billions of dollars; changes relative to baseline projections to 2032 and 2047) 
 Exports Imports 
Trade with TPP partners $57.2 5.6% $47.5 3.5% 
 New FTA partners $34.6 18.7% $23.4 10.4% 
 Existing FTA partners $22.6 2.7% $24.2 2.1% 
Trade with the world $27.2 1.0% $48.9 1.1% 
Source: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, 
United States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 4607, May 2016, p. 71. 
Similar to previous studies of FTAs, the ITC analysis of the TPP estimated the effects of 
liberalizing tariffs and nontariff measures (NTMs) on goods. The largest U.S. tariff reductions for 
TPP countries that currently do not have a trade agreement with the United States are for certain 
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footwear, sugars and sugar-containing products, titanium downstream products, and wearing 
apparel. The largest reduction in tariffs on U.S. exports by TPP countries that currently do not 
have a trade agreement with the United States include exports of beef, footwear, and corn grain.29 
The ITC study also examined the effects of TPP on specific industries. According to this analysis, 
gains in output and employment would be driven by changes in the agriculture and food sector, 
while output and employment in the manufacturing, natural resources and energy sectors would 
fall slightly as resources would be shifted from these sectors to other sectors in the economy, as 
indicated in Table 4. Shifts in employment and changes in the use of resources reflect the changes 
in tariff rates that would provide incentives for resources to shift from other sectors of the 
economy to those sectors in which foreign tariff rates were reduced. Global U.S. exports of 
services were estimated to be $4.8 billion higher by 2032, while services exports to TPP countries 
was projected to be 10.8 % ($16.6 billion) higher, and exports of services to non-TPP countries 
were projected to be 1.9% ($11.8 billion) lower. 
Table 4. ITC Estimated Broad Sector-Level Effects of TPP on U.S. Output, 
Employment, and Trade 
(in billions of dollars; changes relative to baseline estimates in 2032) 
 Exports Imports Output Employment 
Agriculture and 
food 
$7.2 2.6% $2.7 1.5% $10.0 0.5% 0.5% 
Manufacturing, 
natural resources, 
and energy 
$15.2 0.9% $39.2 1.1% $-10.8 -0.1% -0.2% 
Services Trade 
Total 
$4.8 0.6% $7.0 1.2% $42.3 0.1% 0.1% 
 Services Trade with 
TPP countries 
$16.6 10.8% $2.1 2.5% NA NA NA 
 Services Trade with 
non-TPP countries 
$-11.8 -1.9% $4.9 1.0% NA NA NA 
Source: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, 
United States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 4607, May 2016, p. 73, and p. 337-338. 
The ITC study also examined the effects of the agreement on removing certain non-tariff 
measures on trade in services and cross-border investment among member economies. In order to 
estimate changes in services trade as a result of the TPP, ITC adjusted the standard GTAP model 
to reflect the impact of liberalizing cross border trade in services by estimating the tariff 
equivalent value of existing barriers to trade in services.30 This estimating process used data 
                                                 
29 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, p. 79; 
and CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress, coordinated 
by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams. 
30 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, United 
States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 4607, May 2016, p. 756. The main academic source cited in 
the report on estimates of tariff equivalent values for trade in services is, Fontange, Lionel, Amelie Guilllin, and 
Cristina Mitaritonna, Estimates of Tariff Equivalents for the Services Sectors, CEPII, December 2011. The unique 
nature of services themselves and a lack of data hamper efforts to estimate directly the cost of barriers to trade in 
services. As a result, this analysis used an indirect approach to estimating tariff equivalents. It used a gravity model 
(which highlights the importance of geographic proximity in determining trade patterns) with data on gross domestic 
product (GDP), distance, remoteness, adjacency, regional trade agreements (RTAs), economic freedom index, and 
(continued...) 
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published in academic articles and an indirect approach to derive tariff equivalents of barriers to 
trade in services. The TPP would remove restrictions on trade in services on a negative list basis, 
meaning that all services that are not explicitly excepted would be covered by the agreement’s 
provisions. In addition, it includes broad disciplines on ensuring the ability to transmit data across 
borders and prohibiting data-localization measures (except for services). These estimates indicate 
that output for the U.S. services sector would be $42.3 billion higher (0.1% increase) under TPP 
relative to the 2032 baseline, as indicated in Table 5. Services exports were projected to increase 
by 0.6% and services imports by 1.2% by 2032. Employment in all services sectors except 
transportation was projected to be higher by 2032 under TPP. 
Table 5. ITC Estimated Effects of TPP on U.S. Output, Employment,  
and Trade in Services 
(in millions of dollars; changes relative to baseline estimates in 2032) 
 Exports Imports Output 
Employ-
ment 
Services $4,797.4 0.6% $6,962.5 1.2% $42,342.6 0.1% 0.1% 
Wholesale and retail trade $848.7 2.5% $542.4 1.2% $7,447.5 0.1% 0.1% 
Transportation, logistics, 
travel, and tourism 
$-1,258.4 -1.1% $1,770.5 1.5% $-719.9 0.0% -0.1% 
Communications $877.7 2.8% $306.4 1.2% $2,845.6 0.2% 0.1% 
Financial services $-12.1 0.0% $787.8 1.1% $1,520.0 0.1% 0.1% 
Insurance $34.4 0.1% $703.5 1.1% $707.9 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services $4,575.5 1.6% $2,031.5 1.2% $11,576.0 0.2% 0.1% 
Recreational and other 
services 
$-687.8 -1.5% $199.3 0.9% $1,749.8 0.1% 0.1% 
Source: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, 
United States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 4607, May 2016, p. 35. 
The ITC adjusted its modelling process to account for potential changes in direct investment that 
could stem from the TPP. The ITC used a four-step process to make its estimate. In the first step, 
the ITC calculated how much the TPP would change investment restrictions by using the OECD’s 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) foreign direct investment Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index [RRI], which covers 42 sectors and subsectors in 31 countries.31 Next, the 
ITC calculated how changes in the RRI would affect foreign affiliate sales for host countries and 
foreign affiliate home countries. In the third step, the ITC used a modified GTAP model to 
                                                                
(...continued) 
common language. This gravity model simulation was based on estimates of a theoretical level of trade in services in 
nine service sectors (Communication; Construction; Business; Transport; Trade; Finance; Other Services comprising 
education, health, defense, and public administration) that would arise if there were no restrictions on trade among 
developed economies and a few emerging economies. These estimates, in turn, were used to compare the differences 
between the estimated values of trade in services with the actual value of trade in services to derive an estimate of the 
tariff equivalent value of the non-tariff restrictions. In addition, in order to estimate the impact of restrictions on trade 
in services, an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign services is assumed, since there 
are no reliable data on the actual value of this elasticity. 
31 The Index focuses on four types of overt restrictions on foreign direct investment: equity restrictions; screening and 
approval requirements; restrictions on key foreign personnel; and operational restrictions (limits on purchases of land 
and repatriation of profits and capital), see http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm. 
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calculate how changes in foreign affiliate sales would affect productivity in each sector in each 
TPP country. Finally, the ITC estimated how the changes in productivity would affect 
macroeconomic variables in the United States.32 Since the United States is considered to be 
largely open to foreign direct investment, the ITC concluded that TPP is not expected to alter 
investment inflows in a significant way. The United States does not have FTAs with five of the 
TPP countries (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam); the ITC estimates that the 
TPP could increase U.S. direct investment into these countries.33  
Peterson Institute for International Economics 
An analysis conducted by Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer and published by the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics34 also used the GTAP model, assumed full employment, and 
made some adjustments to the standard GTAP model to estimate the economic impact of the TPP. 
These adjustments generated a more positive impact on trade in services and a greater response 
by foreign investment than the ITC study. This estimate concluded that the agreement would 
increase U.S. income and directly generate jobs in the U.S. economy. The study also estimated 
that the TPP could increase U.S. annual GDP by $131 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, and could increase 
annual exports by $357 billion, or 9.1% of U.S. exports, by 2030 when the TPP would be 
expected to be fully in force, as indicated in Table 6.  
Table 6. PIIE Estimated Changes in Baseline GDP With the TPP, 2015-2030 
(in billions of 2015 dollars) 
 
Baseline (billions of dollars (2015) 
Change with TPP (billions of 
dollars (2015) 
 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 
TPP members $28,969 $32,971 $37,094 $41,011 $98 $291 $465 
United States 18,154 20,736 23,372 25,754 29 88 131 
Japan 4,214 4,462 4,693 4,924 39 91 125 
Canada 1,981 2,227 2,472 2,717 8 22 37 
Australia 1,704 1,986 2,292 2,590 1 8 15 
Mexico 1,339 1,598 1,868 2,169 3 11 22 
Malaysia 349 444 553 675 7 28 52 
Singapore 320 380 437 485 2 8 19 
Chile 269 329 397 463 0 2 4 
Vietnam 209 281 378 497 7 22 41 
Peru 219 287 363 442 1 6 11 
                                                 
32 ITC, Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, p. 760. 
33 Ibid., p. 39. 
34 The model used in the study attempted to provide a robust and comprehensive estimate of the agreement and to 
simulate the dynamic rates of growth and trade that have occurred in the Pacific region by estimating annual rates of 
GDP growth out to 2030. The model estimates were based on historical data available at the time of the study, updated 
in 2016. Petri, Peter A., Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai, The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific 
Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2012, Petri, 
Peter A.; and Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates, Working 
Paper Series, WP 16-2, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2016. 
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Baseline (billions of dollars (2015) 
Change with TPP (billions of 
dollars (2015) 
 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 
New Zealand 192 217 241 264 1 4 6 
Brunei 20 24 27 31 0 1 2 
Non-TPP members $52,066 $63,652 $77,596 $92,790 $13 $28 $27 
Europe 17,893 19,746 21,451 23,189 12 34 48 
China 11,499 16,058 21,689 27,839 -1 -8 -18 
India 2,210 3,086 4,197 5,487 0 -2 -5 
Korea 1,384 1,672 1,967 2,243 -1 -5 -8 
Indonesia 927 1,240 1,687 2,192 0 -1 -2 
Taiwan 511 619 707 776 0 1 1 
Thailand 411 516 656 812 -1 -4 -7 
Philippines 329 436 547 680 0 -1 -1 
Hong Kong 300 358 412 461 2 4 6 
WORLD $81,035 $96,623 $114,690 $133,801 $111 $319 $492 
Source: Petri, Peter A.; and Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New 
Estimates, Working Paper Series, WP 16-2, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2016. 
In the short run, the model scenario estimated that the potential for unemployment in the U.S. 
economy would be equivalent to about 0.1% of U.S. annual GDP.35 This increase in GDP is 
comprised of four components: (1) increased flows in foreign direct investment; (2) reduced non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods; (3) reduced in non-tariff barriers to trade in services; and 
(4) cuts in tariff rates, as indicated in Figure 2. Similar in some respects to the ITC study, which 
attributed the largest gains from TPP to provisions in the agreement that affect traded goods, the 
authors estimate that the largest economic gains from TPP will arise from reductions in non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) for goods and services. While incorporating estimates of NTBs allows for a more 
complete analysis, it also introduces an increased degree of uncertainty, since the value of NTBs 
is not observed directly, but must be estimated. Also, the authors estimate that annual global GDP 
will increase by $492 billion by 2030, and Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam will experience large 
increases in GDP, in large part because they are the countries with the highest existing trade 
barriers in certain sectors. Countries potentially experience the largest economic gains from trade 
agreements by lowering trade barriers and increasing domestic competition. 
                                                 
35 Petri and Plummer, The Economics of Analyzing the TPP, p. 4-5. 
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Figure 2. PIIE Estimated Components of Economic Gains for TPP Members, 2030 
(in billions of 2015 dollars) 
 
Source: Petri, Peter A.; and Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New 
Estimates, Working Paper Series, WP 16-2, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2016. 
Among non-TPP countries, Europe is projected to experience an increase in GDP of about $50 
billion by 2030, due to increased exports to TPP countries that experience gains in real incomes 
and by increases in exports of services due to liberalization of services trade and foreign 
investment by TPP members. China, India, and Thailand, which are direct competitors to TPP 
countries, are projected to lose income. South Korea is projected to lose some of the economic 
gains it has experienced under the South Korea-United States FTA, as indicated in Figure 3.  
The authors also estimate that the TPP likely will raise U.S. wages, and alter the composition of 
jobs in the economy, but not alter the overall level of U.S. employment, similar to the estimates 
by the ITC. Both capital and labor are expected to benefit from the agreement, although labor’s 
share is projected to increase somewhat more as a proportionate share of the total amount of 
benefits. Given these benefits, the authors argue that each year the agreement is delayed will 
result in a $94 billion permanent loss to the U.S. economy. The authors further estimate that the 
agreement could add about 19,000 jobs annually to the overall number of jobs gained and lost 
annually in the economy, or jobs that are eliminated in one sector, but added in another, or job 
churn. The authors also project that using a different and more expansive, but potentially 
unrealistic, approach would be to estimate all jobs that are directly and indirectly displaced by 
imports, which potentially could total 53,000 U.S. jobs, adding an estimated 0.1% to annual labor 
market turnover.36 
                                                 
36 Petri, New Estimates, p. 3. 
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Figure 3. PIIE Estimated Components of Economic Gains for  
Non-TPP Members, 2030 
(in billions of 2015 dollars) 
 
Source: Petri, Peter A.; and Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New 
Estimates, Working Paper Series, WP 16-2, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2016. 
Note: ROW stands for “rest of the world.” 
The estimates by Petri, et. al. are based on projections of annual growth in GDP and national 
income for the participants in the TPP agreement from 2015 to 2030, relative to the baseline 
projections, with a large share of the benefits accruing after 2020. The model incorporates 
provisions agreed upon in the final version of the agreement, but also necessarily incorporates 
some subjective assessments of the nature and economic impact of the 30 chapters that comprise 
the agreement. The analysis also projects increased inward and outward investment flows, 
reflecting reduced barriers to foreign investment and a more attractive investment climate. This 
analysis projects that U.S. exports of certain types of goods will increase, including, primary 
goods (agriculture and mining), advanced manufacturing, and services, while imports are 
expected to increase in labor-intensive manufacturing products and in some types of services.  
According to the authors, the projection of investment flows in the model attempts to reflect the 
dynamic nature of economic activity in the TPP economies by assuming that the agreement 
potentially could induce additional firms into exporting. Such an assumption likely would make 
the estimated impact of the agreement larger than would projections using models that did not 
incorporate this assumption. This assumption also would require a number of subjective 
decisions, since trade models generally do not contain the types of microeconomic behavioral 
data on firms that would be necessary to forecast accurately which firms might decide to engage 
in exporting directly as a consequence of a particular trade agreement. The model also relies on 
estimates of the annual value of national income for the participants that stems from the trade 
agreement and a projection of the annual rates of GDP growth for the countries involved.  
The authors projected U.S. GDP in 2025 of $20 trillion and by dividing the GDP projection by 
the projected number of workers in the U.S. labor force in 2025 of 168 million, they derive an 
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equivalent value of $121,000 ($20 trillion / 168 million) for the average income for each U.S. 
worker in 2025. The authors also estimate the FTA will generate annual gains in income for the 
U.S. economy that will rise to $59 billion annually, rising slowly to reach $79 billion annually by 
2025.37 The authors argue that the estimated annual income effect can be equated to an annual 
increase in employment, which some observers have interpreted to mean that the data imply a net 
positive annual gain in employment over the baseline projection of 487,000 jobs ($59 billion / 
$121,000) by 2025, more than twice the number of annual job gains projected by the ITC.  
The authors argue, however, that the estimated employment effects will consist primarily of shifts 
in employment among sectors of the economy as a result of the full employment assumption. The 
authors caution that 
the trade-employment relationship is complicated and not well understood. For one thing, 
the relationship is very sensitive to underlying macroeconomic circumstances. The 
macroeconomic analysis of employment effects, in turn, requires very different models 
from those used to understand the microeconomics of international competition.
38
  
The authors also state that they purposely did not attempt to estimate the number of jobs that 
might arise from the agreement.39 They argue that “[t]he reason we don’t project employment is 
that, like most trade economists, we don’t believe that trade agreements change the labor force in 
the long run. The consequential factors are demography, immigration, retirement benefits, etc. 
Rather, trade agreements affect how people are employed, and ideally substitute more productive 
jobs for less productive ones and thus raise real income.”40 
World Bank 
Another estimate of the potential economic impact of the TPP was published by the World Bank, 
based in part on the study by Petri and Plummer, who served as co-authors.41 The estimate also 
used the GTAP model, with some adjustment, and the full employment assumption. These 
adjustments assume that trade in goods and services will increase as a result of regulatory 
convergence among TPP and non-TPP members. The model simulation projects that by 2030 
relative to baseline projections, the TPP would increase member country GDP on average by 
1.1%, ranging from over 8% for Vietnam to 0.5% for the United States, or about the same as the 
projections by Petri and Plummer for the Peterson Institute, as indicated in Figure 4. This upward 
shift in GDP stems from model simulations that the agreement would stimulate a shift in 
resources towards more productive firms and sectors and expand export markets, as indicated by 
conventional trade theory. The impact on members of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA: United States, Canada, and Mexico) would be about 0.6% of GDP, due to the low share 
of trade in GDP, primarily in the United States, and the already-low average tariff rates.  
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 75. 
38 Ibid., p. 57. 
39 Other economists have used the analyses by Petri and Plummer to make such an assessment. Lawrence, Robert Z., 
and Tyler Moran, Adjustment and Income Distribution Impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Working Paper 16-5, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2016. 
40 Kessler, Glenn, The Obama Administration’s Illusionary Job Gains From the Trans-Pacific Partnership, The 
Washington Post, January 30, 2015. 
41 Lakatos, Csilla, Maryla Maliszewska, Franziska Ohnsorge, Peter Petri, and Michael Plummer, Potential 
Macroeconomic Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Global Economic Perspectives: Spillover Amid Weak 
Growth, World Bank Group, January 2016. 
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Spillover effects on non-TPP countries are expected to be small, but positive as a result of greater 
regulatory harmonization. For non-TPP members, the trade diversion effects are projected to be 
limited, as a result of the large share of trade that currently occurs among TPP countries. 
Consequently, aggregate losses to non-TPP countries are estimated to amount to 0.1% of GDP by 
2030. Only South Korea, Thailand, and some other Asian economies are expected to experience 
losses exceeding 0.3% of GDP. The study also projects that the agreement will lift trade among 
the TPP members by 11% by 2030. 
According to the authors, the benefits of the agreement will materialize slowly, but accelerate 
towards the end of the projection period. These benefits would be derived mostly from reductions 
in non-tariff measures and measures that benefit services. The authors estimate that 15% of the 
projected increase in GDP would be due to lower tariff rates, while non-tariff measures would 
account for 53% of the increase in exports of goods and 51% of the increase in exports of 
services.42 This estimate also “allows for the emergence of trade in products not previously traded 
between pairs of countries.”43  
Figure 4. World Bank Estimated Changes in GDP With TPP, 2030 
(percentage change in GDP) 
 
Source: Lakatos, Csilla, Maryla Maliszewska, Franziska Ohnsorge, Peter Petri, and Michael Plummer, Potential 
Macroeconomic Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Global Economic Perspectives: Spillover Amid Weak 
Growth, World Bank Group, January 2016 
The authors adopt three assumptions that are important to deriving their results: 
1. Cumulative rules of origin—are expected to encourage regional production 
networks. The authors estimate that the rules of origin will lead to the 
replacement of 40% of imported inputs with higher-cost inputs from TPP 
members to qualify for low TPP tariffs. 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 226-227. 
43 Ibid., p. 225. 
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2. Existing services barriers—estimated indirectly from bilateral trade flows, based 
in part on results from the U.S.-South Korea FTA. 
3. Non-discriminatory trade liberalization—more transparent regulatory 
approaches are expected to facilitate increased trade with non-TPP members.44 
The authors expect that over the long run the TPP will accelerate shifts among the various sectors 
of the economy. For advanced economies, these shifts likely will favor traded services, advanced 
manufacturing, and for some resource-rich economies, primary products and investments. 
Developing countries are projected to experience growth in manufacturing, especially in unskilled 
labor-intensive industries, and in some production of primary products. These shifts translate into 
a higher value placed on skilled workers in the advanced economies and an increase in wages of 
unskilled workers in developing economies. For the United States, the authors project that 
changes in real (adjusted for inflation) wages are expected to be small as wages for unskilled and 
skilled wages increase by 0.4% and 0.6%, respectively, by 2030, or that wages for skilled workers 
are expected to rise by more than wages for unskilled workers. 
This approach attempts to incorporate the effects of the agreement’s rules of origin and potential 
economic benefits that arise from greater regulatory convergence among the TPP members. The 
authors conclude that a common rules approach will increase intra-regional trade in affected 
industries.45 In the model, trade with non-TPP members depends on existing standards in non-
member counties and on hypothetical mutual recognition agreements on the rules of origin. Such 
agreements would provide limited preferential treatment to some trade with non-TPP members, 
but such countries currently are not party to the agreement. As a result of changes in regulatory 
standards alone, trade with non-TPP members are projected to vary by the level of economic 
development. Trade with non-TPP developed economies is expected to increase, while trade with 
non-TPP developing economies is expected to decrease, because firms in developing countries 
are expected to be hurt more by more stringent regulatory standards in some markets and are less 
able to gain from the types of economies of scale that are available to firms in developed 
economies. Trade between TPP and non-TPP countries is also expected to be affected by rules of 
origin with countries that have adopted mutual recognition with permissive rules of origin and are 
likely to fare better than countries with more restrictive rules. 
The authors conclude by arguing that 
Against the background of slowing trade growth, rising non-tariff impediments to trade, 
and insufficient progress in global negotiations, the TPP represents an important 
milestone. The TPP stands out among FTAs for its size, diversity, and rulemaking. Its 
ultimate implications, however, remain unclear. Much will depend on whether the TPP is 
quickly adopted and effectively implemented, and whether it triggers productive reforms 
in developing and developed countries. Broader systemic effects, in turn, will require 
expanding such reforms to global trade, whether through TPP enlargement, competitive 
effects on other trade agreements, or new global rules.
46
 
Tufts University, Global Development and Environment Institute 
Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute sponsored another study of the 
economic impact of the TPP, using the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM).47 This study 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 225-226. 
45 ibid., p. 232. 
46 Ibid., p. 229. 
47 Capaldo, Jeronim and Alex Izurieta, Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality, and other Risks of the Trans-Pacific 
(continued...) 
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differs markedly from the previous studies, because the GPM model is not a GTAP-type CGE 
model and the structure of the model and the assumptions that are used differ substantially from 
those used in the three previous examples. As a result of these differences, the authors reach the 
non-standard conclusion that all TPP members will experience job losses, which are projected to 
total 771,000 jobs, with the largest losses occurring in the United States, as indicated in Table 7.  
The study also estimates that the TPP will negatively affect growth and employment in non-TPP 
countries, with Europe losing 879,000 jobs and non-TPP developing countries projected to lose 
about 4.5 million jobs by 2025. The authors argue that these effects increase the risk of “global 
instability and a race to the bottom, in which labor incomes will be under increasing pressure.”48 
The authors also argue that their model is based on “more realistic assumptions about economic 
adjustment and income distribution,” than the standard CGE model.49 They term their model a 
“demand-driven, global econometric” macroeconomic model, compared with the microeconomic 
feature of the GTAP model. Previously, the authors used this model to develop estimates of the 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), a study that has come under critical 
review by trade economists.50  
Table 7. Capaldo and Izurieta Estimated Changes With TPP, 2015-2025 
(in percentage change and thousands) 
 
Net Exports (% of 
GDP) 
GDP Growth 
(%) 
Employment 
(thousands) 
Total TPP   -771 
United States 0.20% -0.54% -448 
Canada -0.58 0.28 -58 
Japan 1.54 -0.12 -74 
Australia 0.71 0.87 -39 
New Zealand 2.13 0.77 -6 
Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam 1.69 2.18 -55 
Chile and Peru 1.18 2.84 -14 
Mexico 0.20 0.98 -78 
Non-TPP, Developed  -3.77 -879 
Non-TPP, Developing  -5.24 -4,450 
Source: Capaldo, Jeronim and Alex Izurieta, Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality, and other Risks of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement, GDAE Working Paper No. 16-01, Global Development and Environment Institute, 
Tufts University, January, 2016. 
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Partnership Agreement, GDAE Working Paper No. 16-01, Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts 
University, January, 2016. 
48 Ibid., p. 1. 
49 Ibid., p. 10. 
50 Bauer, Matthias and Frederik Erixon, “Splendid Isolation” as Trade Policy: Mercantilism and Crude Keynesianism 
in “the Capaldo Study” of TTIP, ECIPE Occasional Paper 03/2015, European Centre for International Political 
Economy. March, 2015. 
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Basic Assumptions 
The authors reject the standard CGE model on a number of grounds. In particular, they argue that 
the standard model (1) incorporates “dubious” assumptions about full employment; (2) does not 
distinguish between wage-earners and profit-earners in ways that obscure potential changes in the 
distribution of income; (3) assumes that real wages increase at the same rate as the growth in 
productivity; (4) assumes constant balances in the government account and in the current account; 
and (5) assumes that there will be an increase in foreign direct investment.51 Due to these 
assumptions and the nature of the GPM model, the analysis that follows is necessarily more 
detailed and expansive than that for the previous studies, which are more conventional in their 
approach. 
The UN GPM model is not a trade model under conventional definitions in large part because the 
model uses very little trade data. Similar to other models, the UN model provides estimates of the 
impact of the TPP on a limited number of individual countries (the United States, Japan, Mexico, 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, in the case of this analysis), while it aggregates all other 
countries into regional blocs. In contrast to the GTAP model, however, the GRM model includes 
only four broad international trade sectors: energy products; primary commodities; 
manufacturing; and services. The authors argue that this aggregation is not significant, because 
their study focuses on “macroeconomic impacts.”52 
In deriving their results, the authors borrow estimates from other studies, generated primarily 
from CGE models, of the potential trade effects of the TPP, since the GPM model itself does not 
contain enough trade data to generate such estimates. As previously explained, CGE models 
typically estimate changes in goods trade only unless they are modified to estimate changes in 
services trade, investment, or consumer welfare. The authors offer the unconventional conclusion 
that the TPP will result in job losses not only in each TPP country, but negative dislocations in 
non-TPP countries as well. Without a detailed explanation of the results by the authors, it is 
difficult to assess how the model derived the results, or how various assumptions may have 
affected the results. The authors proceed by 
 Following the “widely held belief” that TPP would affect international 
competition by “pushing countries to increase trade performance.” This is 
accomplished by producers in each country lowering their prices and cutting their 
costs in order to preserve their market shares. The authors “assume” that this 
process would lower nominal unit labor costs through the combined actions of 
business managers and “policymakers” who negotiate lower wages;  
 Contending that this process would affect the distribution of income between 
labor and business profits in favor of profits for businesses, thereby lowering 
labor’s share of income, because the TPP would affect the incentives for 
countries to “tilt income distribution in favor of profits,” which the authors 
analyze by “estimating the impact of changes in unit labor costs on international 
market shares;”53 
 Assuming that economic sectors of the economy that are affected negatively by 
the TPP agreement would create a demand shortfall in the economy, because, as a 
                                                 
51 Capaldo, p. 7-8. 
52 Ibid., p. 12. 
53 Ibid., p. 13. 
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sector contracts, “other sectors may suffer as well,” leading to “large job losses 
and drive the economy into recession;”54  
 Arguing that the TPP would push firms and other borrowers to seek higher 
returns in order to avoid losing investors. The authors assume that a higher profit 
rate necessarily requires a lower labor share of income; 
 Asserting that inflows of foreign income “depend on a country’s fiscal policy,” 
which would require countries to adjust to attract foreign capital; and  
 Concluding by asserting that, “since all TPP countries would want to preserve 
their market shares, we assume that they will engage in a race to the bottom, 
pushing labor shares downward across the whole TPP bloc.”55 
Other Assumptions 
This series of steps requires assumptions and assertions that, in a number of cases, contradict 
standard economic concepts, often without explanation or the requisite theoretical or analytical 
basis. As previously indicated, standard trade theory indicates that trade agreements such as the 
TPP generally are expected to generate a number of economic effects, both positive and negative, 
although the net sum is expected to be positive for all participating countries. This study, 
however, focuses exclusively on the negative effects, or on the adjustments costs, even though 
trade models are not capable of precisely estimating these adjustment costs. As noted above, the 
costs and benefits associated with trade agreements do not accrue to the economy at the same 
speed: costs to the economy in the form of job losses generally are experienced in the initial 
stages of the agreement, while the benefits to the economy generally accrue over time.  
The authors also criticize the typical CGE model assumption of full employment. Given the long-
term time horizon of most trade agreements to be fully implemented, assumptions of full 
employment generally are not thought to be unreasonable, since economic activity is expected to 
adjust to shocks by returning to its long-run growth pattern of full employment.56 The adjustment 
of the economy to shocks is thought to be either automatic through market adjustments, or 
through deliberate adjustments in macroeconomic policies (either through fiscal policies 
including adjustments in tax rates or in government spending, or in monetary policies). Also, at an 
unemployment rate of 4.7%, the United States is effectively nearing its theoretical full-
employment limit. Concurrently, measures of capacity utilization, or the amount of slack 
productive capacity in the economy, indicate that levels in early 2016 are below long-run rates of 
utilization. With excess productive capacity and with tightening labor markets, benefits going to 
labor may well rise relative to returns to businesses as firms compete for workers by offering 
higher wages. 
The net positive economic effects from trade agreements are expected to arise from lower tariff 
rates that, in turn, increase the amount of trade among all TPP participants. Lower import costs 
increase choices for consumers, improve their real purchasing power, and improve long-run 
productivity in ways that affect the overall efficiency of the economy. In the TPP, businesses are 
anticipated to improve their performance through the mutual lowering of market-distorting tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers during the implementation period rather than through a “race to the 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 11. 
55 Ibid., p. 13. 
56 Petri, Peter A., and Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 16-2, January, 2016, p. 7. 
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bottom,” as assumed by the authors. The TPP also is expected to yield other long-term 
productivity gains through mutual reductions in informal market barriers that can stifle 
competition within national economies, create market inefficiencies, and distort international 
trade.  
Adjustment Costs 
As previously indicated, the negative effects of trade agreements, generally thought to be 
economic inefficiencies in production, job losses, and downward pressure on wages in import-
competing industries, are referred to as “adjustment costs,” because economies are expected to 
shift, or adjust, capital and labor within the economy from declining sectors to growing sectors of 
the economy in response to market forces. The authors, however, make no assumptions about 
shifting resources within the economy in response to market signals to more productive activities 
and base their analyses exclusively on the negative adjustment costs. International trade, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally, can also be affected by a broad range of economic factors, including 
economic recessions or financial crises and such new entrants into the global economy as the 
former Eastern European countries, India, and China, that can affect the global supply of labor 
and, therefore, the wages of workers in certain import-sensitive industries. 
According to the IMF, for instance, the effective global labor market quadrupled over the past two 
decades through the opening of China, India, and the former Eastern bloc countries. The United 
States and other developed economies access this global labor market through (1) imports of final 
goods and services, including intermediate goods; (2) offshoring of production; and (3) 
immigration. According to the IMF, the internationalization of labor contributed to rising labor 
compensation in the advanced economies by increasing productivity and output, while emerging 
market economies benefited from rising wages.57 Increased exports from labor-intensive 
developing economies would be expected to push down wages, adjusted for productivity, for 
unskilled workers in developed economies, thereby reducing labor’s share of income. 
Nevertheless, workers in developed economies could still be better off if the positive effects of 
increased trade and productivity on the economy are positive, as expected. The IMF also 
concluded that globalization is only one of several factors that have acted to reduce the share of 
income accruing to labor in advanced economies and that technological change likely has played 
a larger role in affecting the distribution of income in the economy, especially for workers in 
lower-skilled sectors.58 
Estimates of losses of jobs and GDP generated by the GPM model are weighted exclusively in 
favor of the projected adjustment costs of the TPP, since the model is not capable of capturing the 
full range of economic effects that are expected with the TPP. In addition, the demand-driven 
GPM macro model does not incorporate important supply side effects that arise from trade 
agreements and, therefore, assumes large losses in employment, output, and wages in all TPP 
partners. As a result, the GPM estimates adjustment costs in a way that precludes any positive 
gains for either consumers or producers in contravention of traditional economic thought and 
decades of experience.  
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GPM Model Limitations  
In part, the author’s estimates of losses in jobs and in GDP arise from the limited amount of trade 
data and the absence of tariff or industry data in the GPM model. While the authors argue that 
such limited trade data are not necessary in the context of their macroeconomic model, trade 
agreements affect the economy as a whole through the accumulated effects at the microeconomic 
level. As a result, without detailed micro data on tariffs, trade, and industry-specific employment 
and output, it is not clear how the GPM macro model captures either the trade creation or the 
trade diversion effects, or the benefits to consumers’ choices or real incomes that arise from 
increased access to a greater variety of goods and services and to lower-priced imports. The GPM 
model also does not capture the gains in productivity and efficiency that arise in the economy 
from the adjustment of capital and labor from import-sensitive sectors to other sectors of the 
economy. 
The GPM model seems to preclude any shift in capital and labor among sectors within the 
economy from declining sectors to more productive sectors. Also, the authors focus on wages as a 
key government policy variable. Among economies that possess differing levels of technological 
development and productivity, however, trade likely is driven more by the value of wages relative 
to the level of productivity than a simple comparison of nominal wages across countries. 
Although the United States is a relatively high wage country, it also is a high productivity 
country, which makes it possible to export high capital-intensive, high technology-intensive 
products. Even U.S. agriculture is considered to be a high technology export activity relative to 
other countries given the vast amount of land available for agriculture in the United States and a 
high degree of mechanization. 
Wages and the Distribution of Income  
The authors assume, without providing any evidence from their model in their report, that the 
TPP will generate only negative adjustment costs. They also assume that businesses and 
policymakers will undertake to negotiate lower wages for all workers in the economy. This 
assumption seems to suggest that the government will replace private labor markets by injecting 
itself into the process of negotiating private labor contracts and setting wage rates throughout the 
economy. This assumption also seems to arise from the notion that international trade comprises 
such a commanding role in the economy that the adjustment costs of trade agreements will force 
wages down throughout the economy and worsen the distribution of income between workers and 
owners. This assumption seems to be imposed on the model, since the GPM model itself lacks 
any detailed industry, production, or labor occupational data. As previously indicated, lower 
tariffs increase opportunities for export-oriented industries. Also, the limited role of trade in the 
U.S. economy relative to other forces and the relative openness of the economy seem to be at 
variance with the commanding role that trade plays in the authors’ estimates. 
Anticipated Economic Gains  
The economic gains for the U.S. economy from the TPP likely will be small relative to the overall 
size of the economy given the extensive number of trade agreements that currently exist among 
the TPP participants and the already-low average tariff rates that exist in the United States. 
Nevertheless, economic theory indicates that cutting tariffs and reducing or eliminating non-tariff 
barriers among the TPP countries likely will generate positive output, employment, and wage 
gains for the economy as a whole, according to generally-accepted concepts about the way 
product and labor markets respond to economic stimuli. In addition, within each industry firms 
differ in their competitive ability: while some import-sensitive firms likely are fully capable of 
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absorbing small cuts in prices that would be required to remain competitive, firms operating at the 
margin of the industry likely would have to make additional adjustments to remain competitive. 
How firms respond to such challenges would determine their long-term viability. 
Government Policies and Trade  
The authors also assume that national governments and businesses will adopt extreme measures 
to preserve their market shares in major export markets. This assumption seems to contradict the 
general proposition that firms, not countries, are the actors that engage in international trade. At 
times, the policy objectives of national governments can be at odds with those of businesses. For 
instance, while national governments and central banks are aware that engaging in certain types 
of monetary policies may move exchange rates in ways that are unfavorable to export-oriented 
businesses, they rarely surrender the broader macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy to 
suit the more narrow interests of individual businesses.  
Similarly, assuming that national governments would adopt policy objectives to preserve the 
export shares of firms or the income shares of labor seems questionable. There seems to be no 
compelling reason why governments would prefer using shares as a policy objective over other 
indicators such as full employment or a stable price level. Firms not only can maintain, but may 
even increase, the amount and volume of their exports to individual countries or globally and still 
experience a declining market share if the total value of exports is rising at a faster rate than are 
exports from a particular country. Likewise, real wages can increase even if labor’s share of 
national income falls as long as the total amount of national income is rising at a faster pace. In 
addition, the concept of market shares is becoming increasingly less relevant due to the growth of 
global value chains, or complex cross-border production systems, that may blur the distinction 
between exports and imports and challenge traditional concepts of domestic versus foreign firms. 
Increasingly, value chains are characterized by trade in intermediate goods, or goods that are used 
as inputs to the final production of goods and services. Trade in intermediate goods means that 
imports are essential inputs in the production of exports. As a result, countries that impose trade 
measures that restrict imports may negatively affect their own exports.59 
The authors also make a number of assumptions about capital flows and the policies they argue 
governments will take to preserve capital inflows. In particular, they contend that capital inflows 
depend on a country’s fiscal policy, or the government’s budget deficit, in order to attract foreign 
capital. This assumption, however, seems to contradict the more commonly accepted concept that 
capital inflows reflect the overall savings-investment balance within the economy as a whole, not 
simply the balance in the government account. Within this context, capital flows bridge the gap 
between the total supply and demand of capital in the economy, or the savings-investment 
balance, which includes the combination of the government’s budget deficit or surplus, including 
the national government and state and local governments, and the surplus or deficit of funds in 
the accounts of households and firms. The combination of these three accounts determines the 
overall capital surplus or deficit in the economy as a whole, which, in turn, affects interest rates, 
exchange rates, and capital inflows or outflows. Capital flows can also be affected by events in 
the global economy. The U.S. dollar effectively serves as the international reserve currency and 
demand for the dollar and dollar-denominated assets is affected by a myriad of factors, including 
actions by investors during times of uncertainty to a flight to quality, or such dollar-denominated 
assets as Treasury securities and U.S. equities. Such foreign investments affect the internal 
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savings-investment balance in the economy and, in turn, the international exchange value of the 
dollar and the balance of U.S. exports and imports. 
Other Estimates 
A number of other studies provide estimates of the impact of the TPP on employment in the 
United States. Often, they use estimates developed by the International Trade Administration 
(ITA) on the annual average number of jobs that are supported by exports in the U.S. economy. 
The ITA methodology is based on three economic relationships: (1) average relationships 
between the value of goods and services in the economy relative to the average number of jobs 
that are required to produce that output for each industry; (2) the value of inputs used in their 
production; and (3) the value of transportation and other marketing services that are required to 
bring goods and services to buyers.60 ITA did not develop a similar methodology to estimate the 
number of jobs related to imports, or any job gains or losses that may be due to imports. In its 
2015 update, ITA estimated that U.S. exports of goods and services in 2014 supported 11.7 
million jobs—7.1 million in the goods producing sector and 4.6 million jobs in the services 
sector.61 
ITA also projected that on average one billion dollars of merchandise goods exports supported 
5,210 jobs, and one billion dollars of services exports supported 7,033 jobs, or an average of 
5,796 jobs supported by goods and services exports combined. Expressed differently, $191,938 in 
merchandise goods exports, $142,186 in services exports, or an average of $172,532 in goods and 
services exports, supported one job in each respective sector.62 
Both opponents and proponents of trade and trade agreements have used the relationship 
developed by ITA on jobs supported by exports in the economy to estimate the employment 
effects of FTAs. In some cases, various groups have used these data in reverse to argue that if a 
certain number of jobs were supported by a billion dollars of exports, then that same number 
could be used to argue that a certain number of jobs would be “lost” by a billion dollars of 
imports, represented by the trade deficit (the difference between exports of goods and services 
and imports of goods and services). They argue further that any net increase in imports with 
countries that are associated with a trade agreement would necessarily result in a loss of 
employment for the economy.63 This approach also has been used by some to argue that the U.S. 
trade deficit implies a net loss of jobs in the economy, because some contend that domestic 
production could be substituted for imports, which would boost both production and jobs in the 
U.S. economy.  
As indicated above, the methodology developed by ITA was unique to estimating a static number 
of jobs in the U.S. economy that were supported by exports and that ITA did not develop a similar 
methodology for linking imports or a trade deficit to jobs in the economy.64 The composition of 
                                                 
60 Tschetter, John, Exports Support American Jobs: Updated Measure Will Quantify Progress as Global Economy 
Recovers, International Trade Research Report no. 1, International Trade Administration,  
61 See CRS In Focus IF10161, International Trade Agreements and Job Estimates, by James K. Jackson. 
62 Jobs Supported by Exports 2014: An Update, p. 2-3.  
63 In the balance of payments accounts, exports are recorded as a positive amount even though they are an outflow of 
goods and services from the economy, because they represent a credit for which there is a specific obligation of 
repayment. Similarly, although imports are an inflow of goods and services to the economy, they typically have been 
recorded as a negative amount, because they represent a debt that must be repaid. See Balance of Payments and 
International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition, International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 30-35. 
64 Jobs Supported by Exports, 1993-2011, p. 1. 
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U.S. imports is fundamentally different from that of U.S. exports. While some imports and 
exports may represent substitutable items, other imports represent inputs to further processing, or 
are items that either are not available or are not fully available in the economy. In addition, 
import-competing industries likely do not have the same mix of capital and labor in their 
production processes as do export-oriented industries so that demands on capital and labor 
markets can vary substantially across industrial sectors. 
ITA has issued various statements indicating that using the data on jobs supported by exports to 
estimate any relationship between imports and jobs, as has been done by some, is a misuse of the 
data.65 As ITA has stated, the employment estimate is a static relationship, or it reflects a 
relationship at a point in time; it is not a multiplier and should not be used to estimate changes in 
jobs associated with changes in exports or imports in a multiplier fashion. This has been done by 
both opponents and proponents of trade liberalization to estimate the number of U.S. jobs that 
have been lost or created as a result of trade agreements. In addition, the ITA estimates relate to 
the average number of jobs that are supported by exports across a broad section of the economy, 
which is not the same as estimating the number of jobs that would be added or lost as a result of a 
trade agreement. 
Issues for Congress 
Congress may consider legislation to implement the proposed TPP in the near future. Part of the 
debate surrounding the agreement likely will focus on the potential impact of the agreement on 
the U.S. economy, particularly the effect on employment. Although the U.S. rate of 
unemployment has fallen by more than half since the high rates reached in 2009, many observers 
remain concerned over the role of international trade and the TPP on the relatively slow growth in 
wages and the distribution of income. Under such conditions, it is not uncommon for 
communities or workers to raise concerns over the potential impact of a new trade agreement.  
An analysis of the available estimates of the potential effects of TPP on U.S. employment, trade, 
and economic welfare raises a number of questions concerning the usefulness of those estimates. 
Economic modeling naturally incorporates various assumptions and entails differing 
methodologies that can have a profound effect on the estimates that are generated, even when the 
estimates are derived from the same economic model. Standard models are well known and 
incorporate standard assumptions and approaches that generally are well explained. Many experts 
agree that the mark of a good economic model is one that uses assumptions and methodologies 
that seem reasonable and are not geared toward generating any particular result. Even estimates 
by these studies can vary substantially. In contrast, some models may use non-standard 
approaches and assumptions that may be difficult to justify and seem to have been chosen in 
order to generate pre-determined results. Consequently, estimates of the impact of the TPP on the 
U.S. economy can vary from positive to negative, reflecting the importance of the assumptions 
that are used to derive the results. 
Given the current state of economic modeling and data availability, the models that are deemed to 
offer the most accurate representation of the effects of changes in trade policy likely can provide 
only rough estimates of the magnitude of the potential changes in employment in certain sectors, 
but cannot offer estimates of the precise size of the shifts in employment. As this report indicates, 
the most important assumption involved in generating estimates of the impact of TPP on 
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employment appears to be the expected level of labor utilization in the U.S. economy over the 
phase-in period. Model simulations based on an assumption of full employment likely track 
closer to the current situation than would data following the 2008-2009 financial crisis when rates 
of labor unemployment were above historical levels. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that 
the U.S. economy will perform at or close to its long-term trend approaching full employment 
during the period following the adoption of TPP. Another major qualification for the estimates 
may be that they do not account for changes in exchange rates, which may have a wide-ranging 
effect on the prices of internationally traded goods and may overwhelm changes in prices of 
goods that arise from changes in tariff rates. 
Estimates of employment effects of new FTAs can be subjective and misleading because they 
represent a partial accounting of the total economic effects of new FTAs. U.S. FTAs typically 
include comprehensive provisions for goods, services, and investment. With few exceptions, 
estimates of possible employment effects of the TPP focus primarily on employment effects in the 
goods sectors and neglect the potential effects in the services and investment areas. The study by 
Petri, et al. attempts to bridge this gap by developing a methodology for making such an 
assessment. It is not possible to draw any conclusions about the extent to which these estimates 
reflect the actual costs and benefits of liberalizing trade in services and foreign investment flows 
without additional information. In addition, the estimates neglect a broad range of impacts for the 
economy as a whole that potentially can provide consumers with large economic benefits and that 
can yield broad productivity and efficiency gains for the economy and may enhance employment. 
As a result, estimates of the employment effects of the TPP may serve poorly as an indicator of 
the total impact of a new FTA on the economy as a whole.  
As policymakers consider TPP, they likely will continue to weigh the results of a range of 
estimates of the employment effects of the agreement to gauge the impact on the economy. In this 
process, policymakers likely would be aided by estimates that clearly state the assumptions that 
are used and that inform policymakers about the broad implications of such agreements for the 
economy as a whole. In addition, policymakers likely would benefit from more reliable data on 
the potential magnitude of the effects that such agreements might be expected to have on specific 
sectors, allowing them to craft programs to assist those most directly affected by the agreements. 
As a result, policymakers may benefit from a number of initiatives to improve information and 
data on the impact of international trade on the economy. These might include 
 Increased information and data on services in the economy, including the shifting 
of in-house services from the manufacturing sector to the services sector and the 
formal and informal barriers to U.S. services posed by major trading partners; 
 Better data on worker dislocations, including the reasons for business closings; 
and 
 Better understanding of the development of global supply chains and the role 
they are playing in the U.S. economy. 
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